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overriding mandatory rules. 
1. Introduction. – A comparative analysis reveals that the ex-
pression of reasons in arbitral awards constitutes a principle of 
international commercial arbitration1. Certainly, such a require-
* Full Professor of Private International Law, University of Granada, Spain.
1 See A. Beaumont, Reasons and Reasons for Reasons Revisited: Has the Do-
mestic Arbitral Award Moved Away from the Fundamental Basis Behind the Rea-
soned Award, and Is It Now Time for Realignment?, in 32 Arbitration Interna-
tional, 2016, p. 523 ss.; J. Bingham, Reasons and Reasons for Reasons: Differences 
between a Court Judgment and an Arbitration Award, in 4 Arbitration Internation-
al, 1988/2, p. 141 ss.; Id., Differences between a Judgment and a Reasoned Award, 
in The arbitrator, vol. 16, n. 1, May 1997; R. Canals Vaquer, La falta de moti-
vación del laudo como motivo de su impugnación por infracción del orden público, 
in Arbitraje, vol. XI, n. 2, 2018, p. 547 ss.; T.E. Carbonneau, Étude historique et 
comparée de l’arbitrage. Vers un droit matériel de l’arbitrage commercial interna-
tional fondé sur la motivation des sentences, in Rev. int. dr. comp., vol. 36, n. 4, 
1984, p. 727 ss.; T.H. Cheng, R. Trisotto, Reasons and Reasoning in Investment 
Treaty Arbitration, in 32 Suffolk Transnational Law Review, 2009, p. 409 ss.; J.L. 
Delvolvé, Essai sur la motivation des sentences arbitrales, in Revue de l’arbitrage, 
1989, p. 149 ss.; E.A. Farnsworth, Sufficiency of Reasons in Arbitration Awards, in 
26 Austl. & N.Z. Mar. L.J., p. 69 ss.; J.C. Fernández Rozas, Motivación del laudo 
arbitral en equidad (Sentencia del TSJ Galicia CP 1ª nº. 18/2012 de 2 de mayo, 
in Arbitraje, vol. VI, n. 2, 2013, pp. 455-46; Id., Motivación del laudo arbitral, in 
Anuario de Arbitraje 2018, Cizur Menor, Aranzadi, 2018, p. 51 ss.; Ph. Frances-
cakis, Des sentences arbitrales non motivées, RCDIP, 1960, p. 297 ss.; P. Gillies, 
N. Selvadurai, Reasoned Awards: How Extensive Must the Reasoning Be?, in 74 
Arbitration, 2008, p. 125 ss.; P. Lalive, On the Reasoning of International Arbi-
tral Awards, in 1 Journal of International Dispute Settlement, 2010, p. 55 ss.; K. 
Landau, Reasons for Reasons: The Tribunal’s Duty in Investor-State Arbitration, 
in ICCA Congress Series n. 14 (Dublin Conference, 2008), Kluwer, 2009, p. 187 
ss.; A. Mourre, Réflexions critiques sur l’abandon du contrôle de la motivation des 
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ment is not shared by all legal systems. In the USA, for instance, 
both main legal rules (Federal Arbitration Act, Uniform Arbitra-
tion Act) and the Supreme Court state that arbitrators are not 
obliged to give the reasons for their decisions2. The same criterion 
is included in institutional arbitration rules as significant as the 
Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration As-
sociation. Rule 46 b) only requires arbitrators to give reasons in 
arbitral awards if parties have so agreed or arbitrators consider 
it as peremptory3.
However, the majority of legal systems allow parties to agree 
the renunciation of reasoning in arbitral awards. This possibility 
would demonstrate that obligation to give reasons is not per se an 
international public policy requirement. Article 8 of the Geneva 
Convention on international commercial arbitration of 21 April 
1961 provides a good example of this exemption4. Some legal 
sentences arbitrales en droit français, in Bull. ASA, vol. 19, n. 4, 2001, p. 634 ss.; H. 
Motulsky, L’exequatur des sentences arbitrales non motivées, in Écrits, t. 2, Paris, 
Dalloz, 1974, p. 408 ss.; A.V. Schlaepfer, A.C. Cremades, La motivación de los 
laudos en arbitraje comercial internacional y en arbitraje de inversión, in Arbitraje 
internacional: pasado, presente y futuro: Libro Homenaje a Bernardo Cremades e 
Yves Derains, t. II, Instituto Peruano de Arbitraje, 2013, p. 1411 ss. 
2 «Arbitrators have no obligation to the court to give their reasons for an 
award», in United Steelworkers of America v Entreprise Wheel Car Corp, 363 
US, 1960, 598; see also Michael P. Pfeifle v Chemoil Corporation, 73 Fed Appx, 
720, 722 (5th Cir. 2003); Gray v Noteboom, 159 S.W.3d 750, 754; Thomas v 
Prudential Sec., Inc., 921 S.W.2d 847; Valentine Sugars, Inc. v Donau Corp., 
981 F.2d 210, 214 (5th Cir. 1993); Anderman/Smith Operating Co. v Tenn. Gas 
Pipeline Co., 918 F.2d 1215, 1219 n. 3 (5th Cir. 1990). This principle has been 
respected even in most of the few States having incorporated the UNCITRAL 
Model Law.
3 Apart from some common law countries, the omission of a reasoning re-
quirement is rather exceptional [IAA North Korea, ICAA Cuba, Art. 26 AA Ec-
uador, Art. 61 AA El Salvador (which seems to limit this requirement to dissenting 
opinions], AA Finland, AA Latvia, CCP Poland and AA Sweden. Sweden is the 
country usually cited as an example in this sense, maybe because of the relevance 
of Stockholm as a reputed international arbitration seat. In the Swedish legal sys-
tem, silence about the expression of reasons usually leads to the conclusion that 
the absence of reasons is not a cause of nullity or irregularity of arbitral awards in 
Sweden (see J.F. Poudret, S. Besson, Droit comparé de l’arbitrage international, 
Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2002, p. 709; S. Jarvin, La nouvelle loi suédoise sur l’arbitrage, 
in Revue de l’arbitrage, 2000, p. 69).
4 “The parties shall be presumed to have agreed that reasons shall be given for 
the award unless they 
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systems even admit the validity of a tacit agreement derived from 
the choice of procedure regulations or a lex arbitri under which 
reasoning of arbitral awards is not mandatory.
Most legal systems, inspired by Article 31.2 UML include, 
together with the parties’ agreement, the possibility of omitting 
reasoning in case of settlement awards. Obviously, the reason 
for settlement awards underlies in the mere parties’ agreement 
included in the award, which is its only reason.
Finally, arbitrator acts sometimes as an expert. This is the so-
called expertise-arbitrage or look-sniff arbitration. For instance, 
in disputes related to international sales, the participation of an 
expert is usual in order to determine the quality of goods in case 
of non-conformity (quality arbitration). Such decisions entail a 
mere positive or negative assessment and no reasons are neces-
sary5. That is why some legal systems expressly exclude the ob-
ligations to give reasons in this kind of arbitration [Art. 1057.5 
a) CCP The Netherlands].
The obligation to give reasons in arbitral awards does not im-
mediately imply a chance to revise or set aside an unreasoned 
arbitral award. Comparative analysis also shows a great diversity 
of options in this regard. This paper will be focused on particu-
larities regarding the control of unreasoned awards derived from 
different possible solutions on the question of the law applicable 
to the merits of the dispute. This question requires the analysis 
of three hypotheses: arbitration in equity (II), arbitration in (cho-
sen) law (III) and arbitration without (chosen) law (IV). Finally, 
reasoning based on overriding mandatory rules affects all of these 
hypotheses (V).
(a) either expressly declare that reasons shall not be given; or 
(b) have assented to an arbitral procedure under which it is not customary to 
give reasons for awards, provided that in this case neither party requests before the 
end of the hearing, or if there has not been a hearing then before the making of the 
award, that reasons be given”.
5 See A. Redfern, M. Hunter, Redfern & Hunter on International Arbitra-
tion, 5th ed., Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 555; A.V. Schlaepfer, A.C. Cre-
mades, La motivación…, cit. supra n. 1; J.D.M. Lew, L.A. Mistelis, S.M. Kröll, 
Comparative International Commercial Arbitration, The Hague/London/New 
York, Kluwer Law Int’l, 2003, p. 649.
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2. Arbitration in equity. – The most evident distinction points 
to opposition between arbitration in equity and arbitration in 
law. In international trade, in the absence of an express choice, 
arbitration is presumed to be in law, which is completely reason-
able6. 
6 This presumption is stated in most national arbitration rules: Art. 427 PCC 
Albania; Art. 49.3 and 68.2 AA Andorra; 24.1 and 43.4 AA Angola; Art. 81 ICAA 
Argentina; Art. 603.3 PCC Austria; Art. 28.3 IAA Azerbaijan; Art. 41 IAA Bar-
bados; Art. 1710 JC Belgium; Art. 40.IV AA Bolivia; Art. 361 PCC Burundi; Sec. 
1287:284 PCC California; Art. 363 CAA Cambodia; Art. 31 AA Cape Verde; Art. 
55.3 AA Cayman Islands; Art. 28.3 ICAA Chile; Art. 3 and 101 AA Colombia; 
Art. 28.3 AA Cook Islands; Art. 19 ADRA Costa Rica; Art. 27.3 AA Croatia; 
Art. 22 ICAA Cuba; Art. 28.3 ICAA Cyprus; § 25.3 Czech Republic; Art. 28.3 
AA Denmark (applicable in Faroe Islands); Art. 13 IAA Djibouti; Art. 33.1 CAA 
Dominican Republic; Art. 3 AA Ecuador; Art. 39.4 AA Egypt; Art. 742.3 PCC 
Estonia; Arts. 31.3 AA Finland; Art. 1512 PCC France; Sec. 42.4 ADRA Gambia; 
Art. 1051.3 PCC Germany; § 42A601 (c) PCC Guam; Art. 37.3 AA Guatemala; 
Sec. 40.4 AA Guernsey; Art. 974-1 PCC Haiti; Art. 66 AA Honduras; Art. 41.3 AA 
Hungary; Art. 28 (2) AA India; Art. 27.3 ICAA Iran; Art. 36.3 AA Japan; Art. 36 
d. AA Jordan; Art. 29.4 AA Kenya; Art. 29.2 AA Kosovo; Art. 182 PCC Kuwait; 
Arts. 776, 777, 789 and 813 PCC Lebanon; Art. 761 PCC Libya; § 620.3 PCC 
Liechtenstein; Art. 39.3 CAA Lithuania; Art. 1240 PCC Luxembourg; Art. 28.3 
ICAA Macedonia; Arts. 449 and 461 PCC Madagascar; Sec. 45 (2) AA Malta; Art. 
28.4 AA Mauricio; Art. 56 AC Mauritania; Art. 1445 CC Mexico; Art. 28.3 ICAA 
Moldova; Art. 40 AA Montenegro; Art. 327-45 PCC Morocco; Arts. 34.2 and 54.3 
AA Mozambique; Art. 32 b) AA Myanmar; Art. 18.2 AA Nepal; Sec. 28 Schedule 1 
AA New Zealand; Art. 1054.1 and 3 PCC The Netherlands; Art. 54 AA Nicaragua; 
§ 31 AA Norway; Art. 39.4 AA Oman; Art. 56.3 AA Panama; Art. 32 AA Paraguay; 
Art. 57.3 AA Peru; Art. 1194.1 PCC Poland; Arts. 39.1 and 52.1 AA Portugal; Art. 
7.01 3) ICAA Puerto Rico; Art. 28.3 CAA Qatar; Art. 601.2 PCC Romania; Art. 
40 CAA Rwanda; Art. 16.1 AA San Marino; Art. 22 AA Sao Tome & Principe; 
Rule 47.2 AA Scotland; Art. 49 AA Serbia; Art. 130 ComC Seychelles; Art. 38.4 
AA Syria; Art. 31.4 AA Slovakia; Art. 32.3 AA Slovenia; Art. 34.1 AA Spain; Art. 
29.3 AA South Korea; Art. 24.4 AA Sri Lanka; Art. 31 AA Sudan; Art. 187.2 LF-
DIP Switzerland; Art. 31 AA Taiwan; Sec. 34 AA Thailand; Art. 14 and 73.3 AC 
Tunisia; Art. 12.C IAA Turkey; Art. 28.4 AA Uganda; Arts. 205.1 and 212.2 PCC 
United Arab Emirates; Art. 28.3 ICAA Ukraine; Art. 28.3 ICAA Uruguay; Art. 8 
CAA Venezuela; Art. 45 AA Yemen; Art. 28.3 AA Zimbabwe. The same principle 
is followed by international Conventions [Art. 15 Uniform Act on Arbitration of 
OHADA; Art. 10 MERCOSUR Agreement on International Commercial Arbi-
tration; Art. VII.2 Geneva Convention on International Commercial Arbitration 
of 1961; Art. 28 UNCITRAL Model Law] and by the main arbitral institutions 
[Art. 21.3 ICC Rules; Art. 22.3 Arbitration Rules of the Stockholm Chamber of 
Commerce; Art. 12.5 Rules of the European Court of Arbitration; Art. 31.1 ICDR 
Rules; Art. 16.4 Rules of The Abu Dhabi Commercial Conciliation and Arbitration 
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But there are no obstacles to choosing some kind of arbitra-
tion in equity relating to commercial matters, particularly if the 
dispute is submitted to a sole arbitrator. It is true that arbitration 
in equity is usually recommended when the arbitrator plays the 
role of an expert or even mediator. In any case, the arbitrator in 
equity must issue an award on the basis of their knowledge and 
honest belief in accordance with their natural sense of justice. 
Thus, common sense is the basic ground of an arbitral award 
issued in equity.
One of the presumed advantages of arbitral awards in equity 
is the reluctance to be set aside due to the wide margin of action 
and reasoning that arbitrators enjoy. As a matter of fact, this con-
clusion is not self-evident, as recent Spanish judgments setting 
aside equity awards demonstrate7. Obviously, those systems that 
do not require giving reasons apply such principle regardless of 
whether the arbitration is in law or in equity. Otherwise, some 
institutional or national rules only permit arbitration in equity 
Center; Art. 39.2 ACICA Rules; Art. 24.3 Rules of The Canadian Commercial 
Arbitration Center; Art. 33.2. Swiss Rules of International Arbitration; Art. 28.2 
Rules of Madrid CIMA; Art. 29.3 Korean Commercial Arbitration Board Rules; 
Art. 33.4 Dubai AIC Rules; Art. 24.4 German DIS Rules; Art. 35.2 Hong Kong 
International Arbitration Center Rules; Rule 60.3 Japan CAA; Art. 11.1 Luxem-
bourg Chamber of Commerce Rules; Art. 40.2 Rules of the National Chamber of 
Commerce of Mexico; Art. 3.1 Maitland Arbitration Chamber Rules; Art. 24.1. 
Mumbai Center for International Arbitration Rules; Art. 17 OHADA Arbitration 
Rules; Art. 30.1 OHADAC Arbitration Rules; Art. 42.1 and 3 of The Netherlands 
Arbitration Institute Rules; Art. 4.2. Spanish Court of Arbitration Rules; Art. 31.2 
Singapore International Arbitration Center Rules; Art. 15.2.2. Arbitration Founda-
tion of Southern Africa Rules; Art. 35.2 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules; Art. 27.3 
Vienna International Arbitration Center Rules]. Only exceptionally, arbitration is 
presumed to be in equity (e.g. Art. 59 AA El Salvador; Art. 2.2 Rules on Arbitration 
of the Qatar International Center for Conciliation and Arbitration). Under some 
legal systems, the choice depends on the parties’ will, but there is not a particular 
presumption (Art. 2 AA Brazil; Art. 56.1 AA Indonesia). Under Art. 329 CCP 
Somalia, the arbitrator is authorized to make the choice, even if this faculty has not 
been conferred by the parties. In Ghana, only customary arbitrations are subject 
to equity (Sec. 93 ADRA Ghana).
7 The decision of the Superior Court of Justice of Madrid (Civil and Criminal 
Ch., 1st Section) n. 1/2018, of 8 January 2018 stated: «Reasoning in equity is subject 
to reasoning requirements derived from due process (Article 21.1 Spanish Consti-
tution): reasonability, internal consistency, sufficiency, respect for rules of logic, 
absence of patent mistake…» (translation by the author). 
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without the need to state the reasons upon which the award is 
based [Art. 603.1 e) CCP Romania], or limit the obligation of 
giving reasons to factual aspects or evidenced facts (Art. 27.3 AA 
Angola). But most of them (actually, the great majority), require 
such expression of the reasons both in law and in equity arbitra-
tion and likewise parties are free to expressly renounce such obli-
gation in both cases. The obligation to give reasons in arbitration 
in equity is expressly stated in some arbitration regulations8, but 
it is also extended by implication in all systems establishing the 
reasoning obligation without any difference between arbitration 
in law and arbitration in equity. Some legal systems introduce 
particular nuances related to the effects of renunciation agree-
ments, which are only permitted in case of arbitration in equity 
(Art. 52.4 AA Andorra; Art. 58 ADRA Costa Rica).
Then, the obligation to express the reasoning in the arbitral 
award is usually the same regardless of the legal or equity na-
ture of the arbitration9. First on all, this is due to the fact that 
both arbitration awards in equity and in law must be based on 
reasoned circumstances or facts. Reasons in awards refer both to 
rules and to facts. The arbitrator must therefore give substantive 
and factual reasons. 
Arbitrariness and unreasonableness of arbitral awards can de-
rive both from lack of legal or factual reasons. Facts are equally 
necessary to know and understand substantive reasons of deci-
sions, although in some legal systems a failure to mention facts 
or the absence of debate about its determination does not jus-
tify setting aside or denying recognition and enforcement of the 
award on the ground of international public policy10. In contrast, 
the judgment of the Superior Court of Madrid (Civil and Crimi-
nal Ch., 1st Section) n. 1/2018, of 8 January 2018 is particularly 
demanding in this sense: «an award that does not weigh up all 
8 E.g. Art. 20 of the MERCOSUR Agreement on International Commercial 
Arbitration; Art. 23.4 of the European Court of Arbitration Rules.
9 See J.C. Fernández Rozas, Motivación del laudo arbitral en equidad…, cit. 
supra in note 1, pp. 455-467; Id., Motivación del laudo arbitral., cit., supra in note 
1, p. 99 ss.; J.C. Fernández Rozas, S. Sánchez Lorenzo, G. Stampa, Principios 
generales del arbitraje, Valencia, Tirant-lo-blanch, 2018, pp. 373-376.
10 E.g. OLG Bremen (2000), Yearbook of Commercial Arbitration, vol. XXXI, 
2006, p. 640.
© Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane ISBN 978-88-495-4199-1
143Reasons in Arbitral Awards: Arbitration in Equity
evidence given during the arbitral procedure is not sufficiently 
reasoned in equity»11. In any case, avoiding arbitrariness cannot 
put in question the arbitrator’s freedom to evaluate and ponder 
evidence and does not require arbitrators to justify why some 
evidence has been better considered than other12. The arbitra-
tor denial of the admission of some evidence does not affect the 
obligation to give reasons either13. But it is possible to consider 
reasons as arbitrary, for instance, if the arbitral award has omit-
ted any reference o evaluation of evidence presented by a party 
that clearly contradict facts considered as proved by arbitrators14.
However, in relation with substantive reasons, differences be-
tween arbitration in law and arbitration in equity are quite sig-
nificant: While arbitrators in law must state their legal reasons 
for their decision, arbitrators in equity have only to express the 
natural criteria, moral or ethical principles upon which they have 
based the award.
Relationships between arbitration in law and arbitration in 
equity are not reciprocal. Arbitration in law must not be based 
on moral or equity principles chosen by arbitrators. Arbitrators 
are subject to parties’ mandate, they shall decide according to ap-
plicable legal rules, they are obliged to express the legal reasons 
on which the selection of the applicable law and its interpretation 
are grounded and they will guarantee procedure rules allowing 
the parties to have an effective legal debate. On the contrary, ar-
bitrator in equity is allowed to have recourse to legal sources that 
are not necessary subject to debate by the parties. Arbitrators in 
equity may invoke legal rules that represent in their opinion what 
11 ECLI: ES:TSJM:2018:46. CENDOJ 28079310012018100001. Translation by 
the author.
12 See in English case-law World Trade Corporation v C. Czarnikow Sugar 
Ltd [2005] 1 Lloyd’s Rep., 422. Among the most recent Spanish case law see TSJ 
Madrid (Civil and Criminal Ch., 1st Section) n. 32/2018, 18 June 2018, ECLI:ES:TS-
JM:2018:8105.
13 OLG Stuttgart de 2001, Yearbook of Commercial Arbitration, vol. XXIX, 
2004, 272; Mary Decker Silany v International Amateur Athletic Federation (Court 
of Appeal for the 7th Circuit, 2004), Yearbook of Commercial Arbitration, vol. 
XXIX, 2004, p. 1262.
14 TSJ Madrid (Civil and Criminal Ch., 1st Section) n. 15/2018, 5 April 2018, 
ECLI:ES:TSJM:2018:3635.
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is just and fair from the point of view of common sense15. Then 
legal rules are brought up as ratio scripta16. That is why some 
authors consider that Lex Mercatoria, essentially constructed 
from general principles and trade usages, shows a high degree 
of compatibility with arbitration in equity17. This opinion seems 
irrelevant as far as arbitrator in equity simply needs to justify 
the criteria employed, so that the reference to legal rules serves 
to illustrate the equity bases of the award18. The recourse to the 
Lex Mercatoria in arbitration in law is much more controversial, 
as explained below.
Therefore, according to some arbitration legal systems, arbi-
tration in equity is not limited to lawyers, as the arbitration in 
law is. Nevertheless, at least some jurisdictions have emphasised 
the fact that arbitration in equity cannot be immune to legal prin-
ciples and rules, particularly in relation with overriding manda-
tory rules of the law applicable to the merits or of the law of 
the arbitration seat19. In this sense, arbitration is not completely 
15 See A. Atteritano, L’enforcement delle sentenze arbitrali del commercio 
internazionale (il principio del rispetto della volontà delle parti), Milan, 2009, pp. 
262-264.
16 French case-law has specially underlined that arbitration in equity exclusive-
ly founded on legal reasons has to determine the coincidence between legal reasons 
and equity reasons grounding the arbitral award [Cour de Cassation (Civ. 2nd ch.) 
15 February 2001 (J.C.P. G 2002, II, 10038, p. 450, commented by G. Chabot), 18 
October 2001 (Revue de l’arbitrage, 2002, p. 359, commented by C. Jarrosson) 
and 2 July 2003 (Revue de l’arbitrage, 2003, p. 1361, commented by J.G. Betto]. 
However, such requirement has been tempered in later decisions, which have been 
admitted a mere reference to arbitration in equity without any obligation to demon-
strate the real scope of this formula (see in particular the analysis thereon of C. 
Seraglini, J. Ortscheidt, Droit de l’arbitrage interne et international, Paris, 2013, 
p. 383 ss.). The most recent case-law simply states that equity reasons must be in 
some way evidenced in the award, even impliedly [Cour de Cassation (Civ. 1st ch.) 
1 February 2012, Revue de l’arbitrage, 2012, p. 91 commented by E. Loquin; 21 
November 2012, nº. 11-12145 and nº. 11-12197].
17 See M. Checa Martínez, Arbitraje internacional y ley aplicable por el ár-
bitro, in Estudios sobre arbitraje: los temas clave, Madrid, La Ley, 2008, p. 332, 
note 409.
18 E.g., Cour de Cassation 20 July 2003.
19 Art. 34.1 h) AA Angola; Art. 212.2 CCP United Arab Emirates; Art. 777 
CCP Lebanon. The judgment of the Superior Court of Madrid 1/2018 is so de-
manding in this sense that finally leads to the denaturisation of arbitration in equity 
through a true revision of the legal reasonability of the award: “In this sense, the 
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independent of legal rules20. Arbitrators must take into account 
overriding mandatory rules from the lex arbitri, as well as those 
from third States or international organizations closely connected 
with the subject of the dispute. Then, if an equity arbitrator has 
to solve a dispute related to a contract closely connected with the 
European market he will be obliged to take into consideration 
mandatory European rules on free competition. Finally, this limi-
tation imposed by public policy reasons advises the choice of 
arbitrators with some legal knowledge, even in equity arbitration.
Therefore, the mere fact that arbitration in equity and arbi-
tration in law use different reasoning criteria does not affect the 
requirement to give reasons in both cases. Both types of arbitra-
tion share the same factual reasoning. Relating to the substantive 
reasons, reasons must be “legal” in arbitration in law, and essen-
tially, but not absolutely, “non legal” in arbitration in equity21.
Consequently, the lack of reasons in arbitration in equity is 
apparently subject to the same reasons for cancellation than ar-
bitration in law. Few legal systems provide specific reasons for 
cancellation referred expressly to unreasoned awards. There are 
references to unreasoned awards (Art. 26 of the Uniform Act on 
Arbitration Law of the OHADA22; Art. 1721.a.iv JC Belgium; 
Art. 1065 1 d) CCP The Netherlands); unreasoned or contra-
indissociable link between equity and the requirement of good faith in exercising 
its own rights is traditional and undisputed in case-law (Art. 7.1 CC), requiring a 
subjective behaviour just or fair and honest and according with the value judgment 
derived from society (e.g. Supreme Court, 1st Ch., 22 February 2001 and 13 April 
2004). In short, judgment in equity, beyond the mere legal judgment (e.g. Supreme 
Court 29 October 2013, § 10 in fine, ROJ 5479/2013), must consider justice of 
the final result and consistency with substantive principles which must inspire the 
dispute resolution, among which is obviously included the principle of equivalence 
of obligations, to which the judgment in equity precisely pays attention (§ 7.4 of 
cited Judgment 62/2016)” (translation by the author).
20 See F. Knoepfler, Ph. Schweizer, Making of Awards and Termination of 
Proceedings, in Essays on International Commercial Arbitration, London, 1989, p. 
166, esp. note 19.
21 See on this distinction between reasoning and legal reasoning in arbitration 
in equity the judgment of the Constitutional Spanish Court n. 43/1988 of 16 March 
(BOE n. 88, 12 April 1988).
22 Applicable in Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, 
Chad, Comoros, Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ga-
bon, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Equatorial Guinea, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo.
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dictory reasoned awards (Art. 1056.5 CCP Algeria; Art. 1244.8 
and Art. 9 CCP Luxembourg); incomprehensible or contradic-
tory awards (Article 897.7 CCP Greece); ambiguous, uncertain 
or contradictory awards (Art. 769.4 CCP Libya). In recognition 
and enforcement procedures, the lack of reasons as a challenging 
cause is limited to cases when the law applicable to the arbitral 
procedures requires giving reasons (e.g., Art. 1721.a.iv CJ Bel-
gium). Finally, some legal systems allow an indirect cause of set-
ting aside by reference to the respect of formal conditions of the 
award, among which the obligation of giving reasons is included 
[Sec. 68.2 h) AA England; Art. 829.5 CCP Italy; Art. 769.5 CCP 
Libya; Art. 90 (2) (h) AA Bahamas; Sec. 63.2 h) AA Guernsey; 
Art. 26.1 d) AA Sao Tome and Principe]. More frequently, legal 
systems apply the general causes for setting aside to unreasoned 
awards: lack of respect for terms of the submission to arbitra-
tion, omission of procedural rules of the lex arbitri and, above 
all, violation of due process or international public policy derived 
from a lack of reasoning or from arbitrary, absurd, irrational or 
openly contradictory reasons. 
In relation with the content of the reasons for the award, ar-
bitration in equity is, however, less vulnerable to cancellation 
due to defective reasons than arbitration in law. Indeed, in ar-
bitration in law the omission of the law applicable to the merits 
could entail a serious inconsistency with the submission to the 
arbitration, particularly if it does not fit into the legal framework 
established by the parties in the arbitration agreement or in the 
terms of reference23. Under the schema proposed by authors such 
as Fouchard, Gaillard and Goldman24, there are three hypotheses 
23 However, some national Courts have denied the annulment on the ground 
of the omission of the applicable law by arbitrators. See e.g. Cour d’Appel de Paris 
of 23 March 2006 relating to Art. 1.502 (3) French CCP, in a case where a party 
contested the application of French Law pushing the Lex Mercatoria into the back-
ground, contrary to contract agreement (Yearbook of Commercial Arbitration, vol. 
XXXII-2007, pp. 282-289). On the contrary, the judgment of the USA Supreme 
Court in Stolt-Nielsen SA v Animal Feeds International Corp (2010 WL 1655826) 
set aside an arbitral award because of mistakes in the determination of the applicable 
law to the possibility of an arbitral collective redress.
24 Ph. Fouchard, E. Gaillard, B. Goldman on International Arbitration, Kluwer 
Law Int., 1999, pp. 943-947.
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where arbitrators’ behaviour may be put in question in relation 
with the applicable law. The first one, maybe the least controver-
sial, deals precisely with arbitration in equity. Apart from cases 
of lack of reasons, the flexibility inherent to equity arbitration 
makes the chances of setting aside awards on the ground of in-
equity to be remote, insofar as it would entail a forbidden sub-
stantial revision of the award.
3. Arbitration in (chosen) Law. – Arbitration in law is, then, 
the usual practice in international trade, while arbitration in eq-
uity is rather exceptional. However, the requirement of arbitral 
awards based on legal reasons, and consequently on an arbitral 
procedure characterized by legal debates varies depending on the 
existence of a choice of the law applicable to the merits by the 
parties. 
All arbitration rules and national arbitration acts all over the 
world unanimously recognize the priority of the law chosen 
by the parties25. Older legal texts seem to reduce this choice to 
25 See the choice of law principle in Art. 43.1 CAA Afghanistan (except law 
that is not valid under Afghan law (Article 53.2 Law); Art. 441 CCP Albania; Arts. 
49.1 and 68.3 AA Andorra; Art. 43.1º AA Angola; Art. 79 ICAA Argentina; Art. 
32.2 AA Armenia; Art. 693.1 CCP Austria; Art. 28.1 IAA Azerbaijan; Art. 68 AA 
Bahamas; Art. 36 AA Bangladesh; Art. 41 IAA Barbados; Art. 36 IAA Belarus; Art. 
1710 JC Belgium; Art. 130 ADRA Bhutan; Art. 38.1 ICAA Bulgaria; Art. 361 CCP 
Burundi; Sec. 1287:282 CCP California; Art. 36.1 CAA Cambodia; Art. 41.1 AA 
Cape Verde; Art. 55.1 AA Cayman Islands; Art. 28.1 ICAA Chile; Art. 28.1 ICAA 
Cyprus; Art. 101 AA Colombia; Art. 29.1 AA South Korea; Art. 28.1 AA Cook 
Islands; Art. 22 ADRA Costa Rica; Art. 27.1 AA Croatia; Art. 29 ICAA Cuba; 
§ 25.3 AA Czech Republic by reference to the applicable law (Art. 3 EU Rome 
I Regulation); 28.1 AA Denmark (applicable in the Faroe Islands); Art. 12 IAA 
Djibouti; Art. 33.2 CAA Dominican Republic; art 39.1 AA Egypt; art 78 AA El 
Salvador; Arts. 46.1 and 46.2 AA England; Art. 742.1 CCP Estonia; Arts. 31.2 AA 
Finland; Art. 1511 CCP France; Sec. 42. 1 and 2 ADRA Gambia; Art. 1051.1 CCP 
Germany; Sec. 48 (1) and (2) ADRA Ghana; § 42A601 (a) CCP Guam; Art. 36.1 AA 
Guatemala; Sec. 40.1 a) AA Guernsey; Art. 974 CCP Haiti; Art. 88 AA Honduras; 
Art. 41.1 AA Hungary; Art. 28 (1) b) i) India; Art. 56.2 AA Indonesia; Art. 27.1 
ICAA Iran; Art. 36.1 AA Japan; Art. 36 a. Jordan; Art. 44.1 AA Kazakhstan; Art. 
29.1 and 2 AA Kenya; Art. 29.1 AA Kosovo; Art. 6.2 AA Kyrgyzstan; Art. 813 
CCP Lebanon; § 7.45 (1) and (2) ComC Liberia; § 620.1 CCP Liechtenstein; Art. 
39.1 CAA Lithuania; Art. 28.1 ICAA Macedonia; Art. 461 CCP Madagascar; Sec. 
30 (2) and (3) AA Malaysia; Sec. 45 (1) AA Malta; Art. 28.1 and 2 AA Mauricio; 
Art. 56 CA Mauritania; Art. 1445 CC Mexico; Art. 28.1 ICAA Moldova; Art. 
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the law of a State, while the most recent regulations clearly ad-
mit the choice of non-national rules or legal bodies, such as the 
UNIDROIT Principles, international conventions not in force, 
and so on. Sometimes, those bodies of rules suffice to solve a 
34.1 and 2 AA Mongolia; Art. 40 AA Montenegro; Art. 327-44 CCP Morocco; 
Art. 54.1 AA Mozambique; Art. 32 a) AA Myanmar; Art. 18.1 AA Nepal; Art. 
1054.2 CCP The Netherlands; Art. 54 AA Nicaragua; § 31 AA Norway; Sec. 28 
Schedule 1 AA New Zealand; Art. 39.1 AA Oman; Art. 19 AA Palestine; Art. 56.1 
AA Panama; Art. 32 AA Paraguay; Art. 57.2 AA Peru; Art. 1194.1 CCP Poland 
by reference to the applicable law (Art. 3 EU Rome I Regulation); Art. 52.1 AA 
Portugal; Art. 7.01 1) ICAA Puerto Rico; Art. 28.1 CAA Qatar; Art. 601.1 CCP 
Romania by reference to the applicable law (Art. 3 EU Rome I Regulation); Art. 
28.1 IAA Russia; Art. 40 CAA Rwanda; Art. 38.1 AA Saudi Arabia; Rule 47.1 AA 
Scotland; Art. 50 AA Serbia; Art 31.1 AA Slovakia; Art 32.1 AA Slovenia; Art 
34.3 AA Spain; Art. 24.1 AA Sri Lanka; Art. 187.1 LFDIP Switzerland; Art. 38.1 
AA Syria; Sec. 34 AA Thailand; Art. 73.1 CA Tunisia; Art. 12.C IAA Turkey; Art. 
28.1 and 2 AA Uganda; Art. 28.1 ICAA Ukraine; Art. 28.1 ICAA Uruguay; Art. 
14.2 AA Vietnam; Art. 45 AA Yemen; Art. 28.1 AA Zimbabwe. Also in Article 
15 of the OHADA Uniform Act, incorporated in Benin, Burkina Faso, Camer-
oon, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Mali, 
Niger, Senegal and Togo. The choice of law is stated in Art. 28 UML and therefore 
incorporated by reference in Australia, Bahrain, Bermuda, Canada, China-Macao, 
China-Hong Kong, Ireland, Singapore and Turkmenistan. Chosen law is also the 
first option in international conventions and institutional rules, such as Art. 10 
MERCOSUR Agreement on International Commercial Arbitration; Art. VIII 
Geneva Convention; Art. 35.1 RUNCITRAL Rules; Art. 23.1 Mexico Center of 
Arbitration Rules; Art. 21.1 ICC Arbitration Rules; Art. 22 Arbitration Rules of 
the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce; Art. 11.4 Rules of the European Court of 
Arbitration; Art. 31.1 ICDR Rules; Art. 16.1 Rules of The Abu Dhabi Commercial 
Conciliation and Arbitration Center; Art. 39.1 ACICA Rules; Art. 24.1 Rules of 
The Canadian Commercial Arbitration Center; Art. 31.2. Swiss Rules of Interna-
tional Arbitration; Art. 28.1 Rules of Madrid CIMA; Art. 29.1 Korean Commercial 
Arbitration Board Rules; Art. 33.1 & 2 Dubai AIC Rules; Art. 24.1 German DIS 
Rules; Art. 35.1 Hong Kong International Arbitration Center Rules; Rule 60.1 
Japan CAA; Art. 11.1 Luxembourg Chamber of Commerce Rules; Art. 40.1 Rules 
of the National Chamber of Commerce of Mexico; Art. 3.2 Maitland Arbitration 
Chamber Rules; Art. 24.1. Mumbai Center for International Arbitration Rules; 
Art. 17 OHADA Arbitration Rules; Art. 30.2 OHADAC Arbitration Rules; Art. 
42.2 of The Netherlands Arbitration Institute Rules; Art. 36.1 Rules of The Qatar 
International Center for Conciliation and Arbitration; Art. 23.1 Arbitration Rules 
ICAC of the Russian Chamber of Commerce; Art. 4.3 Spanish Court of Arbitra-
tion Rules; Art. 31.1 Singapore International Arbitration Center Rules; Art. 15.1 
Arbitration Foundation of Southern Africa Rules; Art. 27.1 Vienna International 
Arbitration Center Rules. 
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dispute, but parties must be aware that gaps are usual, so that 
a subsidiary choice of a national law is advised. For instance, 
the Vienna Convention does not include clear rules on hardship 
nor does it deal with questions related to validity aspects of sale 
contracts.
The choice of law by the parties is, then, the first rule. But 
usually rules and regulations do not clarify if that choice must 
be express or tacit. An implied choice is always a great source 
of problems if such a choice is disputed. A tacit choice implies a 
choice that need be interpreted considering the wording of the 
contract, the behaviour of the parties, the arbitral seat26, the us-
ages between them, and so on. But the determination of a tacit 
choice is not a question of fact, but a question of law. Common 
law and civil law approaches to implied-terms are quite differ-
ent. Therefore, arbitrators face a vicious circle, with unforeseen 
consequences. If they deny the argument of a party in order to 
recognise a tacit choice of the applicable law, the award could be 
attacked on the ground of lack of respect for the submission to 
arbitration by the parties. Their decision in order to accept a tacit 
choice is less problematic, given that in the absence of choice of 
law arbitrators are free to determine the law applicable to the 
merits. In any case, in my opinion tacit choice must be cast aside 
in the field of arbitration, because it is both irrational27 and un-
necessary, due to the wide powers of arbitrators for determining 
the applicable law in the absence of choice and taking into con-
sideration all surrounding circumstances.
It is also important for the parties to distinguish between the 
law applicable to the contract and the law applicable to the merits 
of an arbitral dispute. When the arbitral agreement is included 
26 This circumstance is particularly significant if the arbitral seat is London or 
any other English city, insofar as far as English Law is prone to interpret the choice 
of an English seat as a strong signal of tacit choice of English law, although this pre-
sumption is tempered in recent times. See Tzortis and Another v Monark Line A/B, 
1968, 1 All ER, p. 949. On the contrary side, see ICC Award n. 5.717/1988 (ICC 
Bull., 1999, vol, 1, n. 2, p. 22). See the critique from J.D.M. Lew, L.A. Mistelis, 
S.M. Kröll, in Comparative International Commercial Arbitration, The Hague, 
Kluwer Law International, 2003, pp. 415-416.
27 See in this sense J.D.M. Lew, Applicable Law in International Commercial 
Arbitration, New York, Oceana, 1978, p. 183.
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in a contract, the choice of law applicable to the merits must be 
included in the arbitral agreement itself, as the law applicable to 
the merits in the arbitral dispute. Sometimes, parties forget this, 
because the contract includes a specific choice of law clause. The 
problem usually derives from the hypothetical different wording 
of both clauses. The arbitral agreement is commonly written in 
general terms, including any dispute between the parties regard-
less of its legal characterization. Of course, this includes contract 
disputes, but also any dispute in the fields of torts, intellectual 
property or any other subject connected with the contract. On 
the contrary, the choice of law clause is possible in the field of 
contracts, even including tort disputes. But it could be limited in 
disputes affecting other fields, such as company law, competition 
law or industrial property, which are however capable of being 
submitted to arbitration.
Moreover, parties must carefully ponder any open reference 
to the Lex Mercatoria or the general principles of trade law or 
of contract law. The Lex Mercatoria is a notion born in arbitra-
tion practice, whose function is just to serve as an escape device. 
There are many different understandings about the meaning of 
this Lex Mercatoria. In the strict sense, the notion only includes 
rules derived from trade usages and consolidated practices in in-
ternational trade. But trade usages are always applicable, even if 
the parties have chosen a national law as applicable to the mer-
its28. The notion is often invoked by arbitral tribunals in a wider 
28 Most national legal systems state that arbitrators must apply contractual 
terms and trade usages, regardless of the applicable law to the merits, following a 
general principle of international arbitration included, e.g., in Art. VII.2 Geneva 
Convention or in Art. 28 UML: Art. 441 CCP Albania; Art. 49.3 and 68.4 AA 
Andorra; Art. 43.5 AA Angola; Art. 82 ICAA Argentina; Art. 28.1 IAA Azerbaijan; 
Art. 41 IAA Barbados; Art. 36 IAA Belarus; Art. 1710 CJ Belgium; Art. 132 ADRA 
Bhutan; Art. 38.3 ICAA Bulgaria; Art. 361 CCP Burundi; Art. 36.4 CAA Cam-
bodia; 1287,285 CCP California; Art. 55.4 AA Cayman Islands; Art. 28.4 ICAA 
Chile; Art. 101 AA Colombia; Art. 28.4 AA Cook Islands; Art. 22 ADRA Costa 
Rica; Art. 27.4 AA Croatia; Art. 30 ICAA Cuba; Art. 28.4 ICAA Cyprus; Art. 
28.4 AA Denmark (applicable in Faroe Islands); Art. 12 IAA Djibouti; Art. 33.4 
CAA Dominican Republic; Art. 39.3 AA Egypt; Art. 742.4 CCP Estonia; Art. 
1511 CCP France; Sec. 42.5 ADRA TGambia; Art. 1051.4 CCP Germany; Sec. 48 
(4) ADRA Ghana; § 42A601 (a) CCP Guam; Art. 36.2 and 3 AA Guatemala; Sec. 
40.5 AA Guernsey; Art. 974 CCP Haiti; Art. 41.4 AA Hungary; Art. 28 (3) AA 
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sense29, that includes soft law as the UNIDROIT Principles on 
international commercial contracts, but it is above all a tool pro-
viding arbitral freedom and sometimes arbitral arbitrariness. We 
can imagine three European arbitrators obliged to apply Turkish 
India; Art. 27.4 ICAA Iran; Art. 36.4 AA Japan; Art. 36 c. Jordan; Art. 44.3 AA 
Kazakhstan (only in the absence of express rules in the applicable law); Art. 29.5 
AA Kenya; Art. 6.4 AA Kyrgyzstan (only in the absence of express norms in the 
applicable law); Art. 29.3 AA Kosovo; Art. 813 CCP Lebanon; § 7.45 (4) ComC 
Liberia; Art. 28.3 ICAA Macedonia; Art. 461 CCP Madagascar; Sec. 30 (5) AA 
Malaysia; Sec. 45 (3) AA Malta; Art. 28.5 AA Mauritius; Art. 56 CA Mauritania; 
Art. 1445 CC Mexico; Art. 28.4 ICAA Moldova; Art. 34.4 AA Mongolia; Art. 40 
AA Montenegro; Art. 327-44 CCP Morocco; Art. 54.4 AA Mozambique; Art. 32 
a) AA Myanmar; Art. 18.3 AA Nepal; Art. 54 AA Nicaragua; Sec. 28 Schedule 1 
AA New Zealand; Art. 1054.4 CCP The Netherlands; Art. 39.3 AA Oman; Art. 19 
AA Palestine; Art. 56 AA Panama (includes reference to UNIDROIT Principles); 
Art. 32 AA Paraguay; Art. 57.2 AA Peru; Art. 1194.2 CCP Poland; Art. 52.3 AA 
Portugal; Art. 7.01 4) ICAA Puerto Rico; Art. 28.4 CAA Qatar; Art. 601.1 CCP 
Romania; Art. 28.3 IAA Russia; Art. 40 CAA Rwanda; Art. 38.1 AA Saudi Arabia; 
Rule 47.1 AA Scotland; Arts. 49 and 50 AA Serbia; Art. 31.1 AA Slovakia; Art. 
32.4 AA Slovenia; Art. 34.3 AA Spain; Art. 29.4 AA South Korea; Art. 38.3 AA 
Syria; 24.3 AA Sri Lanka; Art. 31 AA Sudan; Sec. 34 AA Thailand; Art. 73.4 CA 
Tunisia; Art. 12 CIAA Turkey; Art. 28.5 AA Uganda; Art. 28.4 ICAA Ukraine; 
Art. 28.4 ICAA Uruguay; Art. 8 CAA Venezuela; Art. 14.3 AA Vietnam (only in 
case of gaps in the lex causae); Art. 45 AA Yemen; Art. 28.4 AA Zimbabwe. The 
same rule is observed in institutional regulations: Art. 35.3 UNCITRAL Rules; 
Art. 23.2 Mexico Center of Arbitration Rules; Art. 21.2 ICC Arbitration Rules; 
Art. 31.2 ICDR Rules; Art. 16.3 Rules of The Abu Dhabi Commercial Conciliation 
and Arbitration Center; Art. 39.3 ACICA Rules; Art. 24.2 Rules of The Canadian 
Commercial Arbitration Center; Art. 33.3 Swiss Rules of International Arbitration; 
Art. 28.3 Rules of Madrid CIMA; Art. 29.2 Korean Commercial Arbitration Board 
Rules; Art. 33.3 Dubai AIC Rules; Art. 24.2 German DIS Rules; Art. 35.3 Hong 
Kong International Arbitration Center Rules; Art. 11.1 Luxembourg Chamber 
of Commerce Rules; Art. 40.3 Rules of the National Chamber of Commerce of 
Mexico; Art. 3.4 Maitland Arbitration Chamber Rules; Art. 24.1. Mumbai Center 
for International Arbitration Rules; Art. 30.3 OHADAC Arbitration Rules; Art. 
42.4 of The Netherlands Arbitration Institute Rules; Art. 36.2 Rules of The Qatar 
International Center for Conciliation and Arbitration; Art. 23.3 Arbitration Rules 
ICAC of the Russian Chamber of Commerce; Art. 4.3 Spanish Court of Arbitra-
tion Rules; Art. 31.3 Singapore International Arbitration Center Rules. In certain 
cases, this reference is omitted, but it is surely implied: e. g. Rule 60.1 Japan CAA; 
Art. 27.1 Vienna International Arbitration Center Rules.
29 See the description of the Lex Mercatoria in the wider sense in E. Gaillard, 
La distinction des principes généraux du droit et des usages du commerce internatio-
nal, in Études offertes à Pierre Bellet, Paris, Litec, 1991, p. 203; O. Lando, The Lex 
Mercatoria in International Commercial Arbitration, in 34 ICLQ., 1985, p. 748 ss.
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law in Palbak v. Norsolor. In this case, the Lex Mercatoria device 
served to flight from that exotic law, completely unknown, and 
to have recourse to more familiar western resources or simply to 
solve the dispute on the ground of equity, good faith or common 
sense, that is, transforming an arbitration in law into an arbitra-
tion in equity or even without law.
Selection of legal rules applicable to the merits by the parties 
provides of course legal certainty, but in the field of arbitration it 
also accomplishes an additional function: it serves to guarantee a 
special reason to control the arbitral award. Actually, one of the 
most important motive for the annulment of arbitral awards deals 
with the exceeding powers of arbitrators, insofar as the arbitral 
award exceeds, alters or does not solve all questions included in 
the arbitral submission (ultra, extra or infra petita). When par-
ties have chosen the applicable law to the merits, this choice is a 
crucial part of the submission to arbitration, and arbitrators are 
obliged to base their award in such rules. If not, parties could 
claim for the award to be set aside30. 
First of all, it is necessary to determine if arbitrators have failed 
to decide in law instead of in equity31. An award in equity where 
the parties’ submission points to arbitration in law is voidable. 
The sole parameter to prevent awards from being set aside is the 
award being apparently based on legal rules, regardless of the 
correction in their application32.
Secondly, arbitrators are obliged to give reasons based on the 
applicable law chosen by the parties or, otherwise, to express 
the reasons to cast aside this law33, for instance because they are 
30 See J.C. Fernández Rozas, Le rôle des juridictions étatiques devant l’ar-
bitrage commercial international, in R. des C., t. 290, 2001, p. 203; J. Hill, Some 
Private International Law Aspects of the Arbitration Act 1996, in 46 ICLQ., 1997, 
pp. 303-304.
31 Thus, the Superior Court of Montreal in Louis Dreyfus & Cir. v Holding 
Tusculum (2008, QCCS 5903) set aside an arbitral award where arbitrators have 
decided in equity and ignored the law chosen by the parties.
32 German case-law illustrates this restriction: OLG Frankfurt 26 October 1983 
(RIW, 1984, 400) and BGH 29 September 1985 (RIW, 1985, p. 970).
33 Some cases are suspected and criticized because of westernization of arbitra-
tors and awards, where choice-of-law clauses of African or Asian legal systems are 
disregarded, e. g., ICC Award 5030/1992.
© Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane ISBN 978-88-495-4199-1
153Reasons in Arbitral Awards: Arbitration in Equity
contrary to international public policy34. Chances for annulment 
are clear if arbitrators have reasoned on the basis of national laws 
different from that chosen by the parties, or they cast aside a 
determined non-national law chosen by the parties, such as the 
OHADAC Principles on International Commercial Contracts, 
without explicit and justified reasons35.
Cancellation of arbitral awards seems more complicated if a 
party invokes a “tacit choice” or the parties have used a vague 
formula for the choice of law, such as a reference to the general 
principles of international trade, the Lex Mercatoria or trade us-
ages36. Chances for setting aside are also reduced if arbitrators 
have applied international trade usages, even contra legem. As a 
matter of fact, there is a trend to make trade usages, like parties’ 
34 See L. Silberman, F. Ferrari, Getting to the Law Applicable to the Merits 
in International Arbitration and the Consequences of Getting it Wrong, in Con-
flicts of Laws in International Arbitration, Munich, Sellier, 2011, pp. 312-313; S. 
Bollée, L’impérativité du droit choisi par les parties devant l’arbitre International, 
in Revue de l’arbitrage, 2016/3, p. 695; C. Seraglini, Livre V: Le contentieux du 
commerce international. Tritre III: L’arbitrage commercial international, in Droit 
du commerce international (sous la dir. de J. Béguin et Michel Menjucq), Paris, 
Litec, 2005, p. 1046.
35 Thus, Art. 53.1º d) AA Egypt; judgment of the Supreme Court of Finland 
of 2 July 2008 in Werfen Austria GmbH v Polar Electro Europeo BV. See L. Sil-
berman, F. Ferrari, cit. supra in note 34, p. 316; C.P. Alberti, Iura novit Curia 
in International Commercial Arbitration, in International Arbitration and Inter-
national Commercial Law (Liber Amicorum Eric Bergsten), Wolters Kluwer, 2011, 
pp. 18-19; G. Bermann, International Arbitration and Private International Law 
(General Course of Private International Law), in R. des C., vol. 381, 2015, pp. 
293-296; also the more skeptical reflections of G. Cordero-Moss, Limitations of 
Party Autonomy in International Commercial Arbitration, in R. des C., vol. 372, 
2014, p. 197.
36 In Ministry of Defense and Support of the Armed Forces of the Islamic Repub-
lic of Iran v Cubic Defense Systems Inc, the District Court of California considered 
that, as the parties have agreed the complementary and supplementary application 
of general principles of international law and trade usages, the arbitral tribunal had 
respected the conditions of the submission to arbitration by applying the UNI-
DROIT Principles and the good faith and fair dealing principles (Yearbook of 
Commercial Arbitration, vol. XXIV, 1999, p. 875). Likewise, given the absence of 
a clear choice of law by the parties, a judgment of the Landsgericht of Hamburg in 
1997 legitimated the application of the Lex Mercatoria by arbitrators (Yearbook of 
Commercial Arbitration, vol. XXV, 2000, p. 710). See H. Kronke et al., Recognition 
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (A Global Commentary on the New 
York Convention), Wolters Kluwer, 2010, p. 272 s.
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agreements, prevailing37. But the possibility of annulment cannot 
be disregarded even in these cases38.
The impossibility of revision or of substantive control of 
arbitral awards, as a general principle of procedures for set-
ting aside or for the recognition and enforcement of arbitral 
awards, sometimes is invoked to unduly avoid the control 
of the obligation to give reasons for arbitral awards. This is 
the case when arbitrators “interpret” the chosen law (e.g. the 
Egyptian law) on the ground of the presumed identity or in-
spiration by another law (e.g. French law), as happened in 
Crocodile Tourist Project C. (Egypte) v Aubert39. Likewise, an-
nulment must be successful if arbitrators unduly invoke the 
impossibility to know the chosen law to justify its substitution 
by their own understanding of the Lex Mercatoria. The ICC 
Award of 20 May 199240 is a good example of disregard of the 
chosen law grounded on the excuse that Egyptian law does 
not determine the dies a quo for the calculation of interests, 
which has been qualified by E. Gaillard as absurd enough to 
discredit the method41. 
37 In the ICC Award n. 8873/1997 (Journ.dr.int., 1998, p. 1017) this is just 
the reason for avoiding Spanish Law that contradicts international trade us-
ages in building contracts on the ground of Art. 7 of the Geneva Convention 
of 1961 and the power of arbitrators in order to establish the scope, function 
and hierarchy of trade usages, insofar as the overriding mandatory rules of the 
applicable law are respected. See also ICC Awards n. 7518 /1994 (Journ. dr. 
int., 1998, p. 1034); n. 6527/1991 (Yearbook of Commercial International, vol. 
XVIII, 1993, p. 44); n. 8486/1996 (Journ. dr. int., 1998, p. 1047), cit. by A.M. 
López Rodríguez, Ley aplicable al fondo de la controversia en el arbitraje 
comercial internacional. El enfoque transnacional de la nueva Ley española de 
Arbitraje, in Cuestiones actuales de Derecho mercantil internacional, Madrid, 
Colex, 2005, p. 711, n. 65.
38 See J. Béguin, M. Menjucq (dirs.), Droit du commerce international, Paris, 
Litec, 2005, p. 1057.
39 Cour d’Appel Paris, 1 March 1988, in Revue de l’arbitrage, 1989, p. 269.
40 Case n. ARB/84/3.
41 E. Gaillard wonders how the Egyptian judges act every time they need to 
pronounce on the calculation of interest. The recurrent idea of gaps actually entails 
a prejudice about the insufficient development of the law of some legal systems in 
non-developed countries (see Trente ans de Lex Mercatoria: Pour une application 
sélective de la méthode des principes généraux du droit, in Journ. dr. int., 1995, p. 
13).
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Likewise, the omission of the chosen law or the undue con-
version of arbitration in law in arbitration in equity have been 
considered as a violation of procedural rules established by 
the parties or in the lex arbitri, rather than for violation of 
the submission to arbitration [Art. V. 1 d) of the New York 
Convention, instead of Art. V.1. b)]42. This remedy has also 
been invoked, particularly in relation with legal systems in-
corporating the UNCITRAL Model law, when the applicable 
law in the absence of choice is determined through an indi-
rect way (by reference to appropriate conflict-of-laws rules) 
and arbitrators disregard the determination of this appropriate 
conflict-of-laws rule and directly apply substantive rules on 
the merits43.
4. Arbitration without (chosen) Law. – Finally, the last hy-
pothesis to be analyzed deals with arbitration in law when par-
ties have not determined the applicable law, so that arbitrators 
may apply whatever national law, non-national rules or the Lex 
Mercatoria. In the absence of choice of law, arbitrators have a 
wide power to determine the law or rules applicable to the mer-
its, particularly if the applicable law is determined by virtue of 
a direct way, that is where there is no need to establish the ap-
propriate conflict-of-law rules44 or the national law most closely 
42 On German case law (particularly BGH of 26 September 1985), see S. Kröll, 
Recognition and Enforcement of Awards, in Arbitration in Germany. The Model 
Law in Practice, Kluwer Law International, 2007, p. 1061.
43 See in this sense the analysis and graphic Appendix to apply for setting aside 
on the ground of such reasons of B. Hayward, Conflict of Laws and Arbitral Dis-
cretion (The Closest Connection Test), Oxford University Press, 2017, pp. 128-143 
and 301-306.
44 This is the rule established in Art. 28.2 of the UNCITRAL Model Law 
and, consequently, in legal systems incorporating this law by reference: Australia, 
Bahrain, Bermuda, Canada, China-Macao, China-Hong Kong, Ireland, Singapore 
and Turkmenistan. The same indirect way is envisaged in Art. 43.3 AA Angola; 
Art. 28.2 IAA Azerbaijan; Art. 68 AA Bahamas; Art. 41 IAA Barbados; Art. 
36 IAA Belarus; Art. 131 ADRA Bhutan; Art. 38.2 ICAA Bulgaria; Art. 55.2 
AA Cayman Islands; Art. 28.2 ICAA Chile; Art. 28.2 Cook Islands; Art. 28.2 
ICAA Cyprus; Art. 28.2 AA Denmark (applicable in Faroe Islands); Art. 46.3 
AA England; Sec. 42.3 ADRA Gambia; Sec. 48 (3) ADRA Ghana; § 42A601 (b) 
CCP Guam; Sec. 40.3 b) AA Guernsey; Art. 41.2 AA Hungary; Art. 27.2 ICAA 
Iran; Art. 29.1 AA Kosovo; § 7.45 (3) ComC Liberia; Art. 461 CCP Madagascar; 
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connected45. If arbitrators are authorized to apply the substantive 
rules (national or not) they consider most appropriated46, there is 
Sec. 30 (4) AA Malaysia; Art. 28.3 AA Mauritius; Art. 28.2 ICAA Moldova; Art. 
40 AA Montenegro; Art. 54.2 AA Mozambique; Sec. 28 Schedule 1 AA New 
Zealand; Art. 32 AA Paraguay; Art. 7.01 2) ICAA Puerto Rico; art, 28.2 CAA 
Qatar; Art. 28.2 IAA Russia; Rule 47.1 AA Scotland; Art. 50 AA Serbia; Art. 
31.1 AA Slovakia; Art. 24.2 AA Sri Lanka; Sec. 34 AA Thailand; Art. 28.2 ICAA 
Ukraine; Art. 45 AA Yemen; Art. 28.2 AA Zimbabwe. The reference to conflict 
rules is also present in international conventions and institutional regulations: 
Art. 10 MERCOSUR Agreement on International Commercial Arbitration; Art. 
VII.1 Geneva Convention on International Commercial Arbitration of 1961; Art. 
11.4 of the European Court of Arbitration Rules (with particular mention of the 
“tronc commun” doctrine); Art. 17 OHADA Arbitration Rules; Art. 23.2 Arbi-
tration Rules ICAC of the Russian Chamber of Commerce; Art. 15.1 Arbitration 
Foundation of Southern Africa Rules. Other legal systems state the application of 
the conflict-of-law rules of the forum (Art. 22 ADRA Costa Rica; Art. 30 ICAA 
Cuba; Art. 742.2 CCP Estonia; Art. 29.1 AA Kosovo; Sec. 45 (1) AA Malta; § 31 
AA Norway; Art. 19 AA Palestine; Art. 1194.1 CCP Poland; § 25.3 AA Czech 
Republic; Art. 601.1 CCP Romania), the substantive rules of the forum (Art. 
44.2 AA Kazakhstan; Art. 18.1 AA Nepal) or the law of the forum including 
international conventions (Art. 40 CAA Rwanda).
45 This option can be found in Art. 427 CCP Albania (for domestic arbitration); 
Art. 603.2 CCP Austria; Art. 39.2 AA Egypt; Art. 1051.2 CCP Germany; Art. 36.1 
AA Guatemala; Art. 36.2 AA Japan; Art. 36 b. AA Jordan; Art. 28.2 ICAA Mace-
donia; Art. 1445 CC Mexico; Art. 52.2. LA Portugal; Art. 38.1 AA Saudi Arabia; 
Art. 29.2 AA South Korea; Art. 187.1 LFDIP Switzerland; Art. 38.2 AA Syria; Art. 
12.C IAA Turkey. Also in Art. 11.4 European Court of Arbitration Rules; Art. 16.2 
Rules of The Abu Dhabi Commercial Conciliation and Arbitration Center; Rule 
60.2 Japan CAA; Art. 33.1 Swiss Rules of International Arbitration.
46 The direct way is the most recent option in many legal systems, including 
Article 15 of the OHADA Uniform Act, incorporated in Benin, Burkina Faso, 
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Guinea, Guinea 
Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo; Art. 43.2 CAA Afghanistan; Art. 441 CCP 
Albania; Art. 49.2 and 68.3 AA Andorra; Art. 80 ICAA Argentina; Art. 38 AA Ban-
gladesh; Art. 1710 JC Belgium; Art. 361 CCP Burundi; Art. 36.2 CAA Cambodia; 
Sec. 1287:283 CCP California; Art. 41.2 AA Cape Verde; Art. 101 AA Colombia; 
Art. 27.2 AA Croatia; Art. 12 IAA Djibouti Art. 1511 CCP France; Art. 33.3 CAA 
Dominican Republic; Art. 974 CCP Haiti; Art. 28 (1) b) iii) AA India; Art. 29.3 
AA Kenya; Art. 6.3 AA Kyrgyzstan; Art. 813 CCP Lebanon; § 620.2 CCP Liech-
tenstein; Art. 39.2 CAA Lithuania (including Lex Mercatoria, but arbitrator must 
justify or motivate the election); Art. 56 AC Mauritania; Art. 34.3 AA Mongolia; 
Art. 327-44 CCP Morocco; Art. 34.3 AA Mozambique; Art. 32 a) AA Myanmar; 
Art. 1054.2 CCP The Netherlands; Art. 54 AA Nicaragua; Art. 39.2 AA Oman; 
Art. 56.2 AA Panama; Art. 57.2 AA Peru; Art. 32.2 AA Slovenia; Art. 73.2 AC 
Tunisia; Art. 28.3 AA Uganda; Art. 28.2 ICAA Uruguay; Art. 14.2 AA Vietnam. 
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little room to challenge the award47. However, the conversion or 
denaturalization of arbitration in law into arbitration in equity as 
a reason for setting aside the resulting arbitral award48 has been 
debated, especially in relation with arbitral awards applying the 
Lex Mercatoria49. Certainly, since the Norsolor50 case decided by 
the Austrian Supreme Court51, there are many court decisions in 
different national systems recognizing the availability of the Lex 
Mercatoria as a way to give reasons secundum ius52. Nevertheless, 
the inherent vagueness of the Lex Mercatoria avoids a general and 
unconditioned recognition of the legal and non-equitable scope 
of the Lex Mercatoria. Depending on circumstances, it is possible 
that an arbitral award inspired by the Lex Mercatoria merely 
conceals arbitration in equity, avoiding then arbitration in law 
derived from the parties’ submission, which would entail a rea-
Among institutional texts the same solution is found in Art. 35.1 UNCITRAL 
Rules; Art. 23.1 Mexico Center of Arbitration Rules; Art. 21.1 ICC Arbitration 
Rules; Art. 22 Arbitration Rules of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce; Art. 
31.1 ICDR Rules; Art. 39.1 ACICA Rules; Art. 24.1 Rules of The Canadian Com-
mercial Arbitration Center; Art. 28.1 Rules of Madrid CIMA; Art. 29.1 Korean 
Commercial Arbitration Board Rules; Art. 33.1 Dubai AIC Rules; Art. 24.1 Ger-
man DIS Rules; Art. 35.1 Hong Kong International Arbitration Center Rules; Art. 
11.1 Luxembourg Chamber of Commerce Rules; Art. 40.1 Rules of the National 
Chamber of Commerce of Mexico; Art. 3.3 Maitland Arbitration Chamber Rules; 
Art. 24.1. Mumbai Center for International Arbitration Rules; Art. 17 OHADA 
Arbitration Rules; Art. 42.2 of The Netherlands Arbitration Institute Rules; Art. 
36.1 Qatar International Center for Conciliation and Arbitration; Art. 4.3 Spanish 
Court of Arbitration Rules; Art. 31.1 Singapore International Arbitration Center 
Rules; Art. 27.2 Vienna International Arbitration Center Rules. 
47 See e.g. Abu Dhabi Investment Authority v Citigroup Inc (2nd Cir. 2014), 557 
Fed Appx 66. J. Lew, op. cit. in n. 27, p. 537; Y. Derains, Possible Conflict Rules 
and the Rules Applicable to the Substance of the Dispute, UNCITRAL’s Project for 
Model Law in International Commercial Arbitration (ICA Congress Series, vol. 2), 
Lausanne, Kluwer, 1984, p. 173.
48 See e.g. French Cour de Cassation (1ss ch. Civ.), 1 February 2012 (Société 
d’Experts en tarification de l’énergie (ETE) v société Gascogne Paper), in Revue de 
l’arbitrage, 2012/1, p. 91, commented by E. Loquin, cit., p. 95 ss.
49 See J. Waincymer, Procedure and Evidence in International Arbitration, 
Kluwer Law Internacional, 2012, pp. 993-994; W. Park, The Lex Loci Arbitri and 
International Commercial Arbitration, in 32 ICLQ., 1983, pp. 50-51.
50 ICC Award n. 3131/1979, Yearbook of Commercial Arbitration, vol. IX, 
1984, p. 109.
51 OGH, 18 November 1982, IPRax, 1984, p. 99 ss.
52 See A. Atteritano, op. cit. in n. 15, pp. 260-262.
ISBN 978-88-495-4199-1  © Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane
158 Sixto A. Sánchez Lorenzo
son for setting aside the arbitral award53. In other words, equity 
reasons instead of legal reasons may be challenged, so that an 
accurate scrutiny of the pertinence and content of the Lex Mer-
catoria is peremptory. In practice, arbitral awards based on the 
Lex Mercatoria or trade usages will seldom be cancelled54, unless 
the award grossly entails an arbitration in equity contrary to the 
parties’ submission to arbitration in law55. A minimal reasonable 
reasoning of used rules or usages will suffice to attack the annul-
ment remedy56. 
Finally, there is another chance to challenge arbitral awards 
on the ground of a violation of due process when the award 
includes legal arguments or reasons that have not be invoked, 
argued or on which the parties have not the chance to debate 
during the arbitral proceeding. Generally, arbitrators are not 
obliged to give reasons according to the arguments or legal in-
terpretations made by the parties, but they cannot introduce the 
applicable law in an unexpected manner, so that parties have not 
the chance to debate thereon57. Thus, the District Court of Cali-
fornia in Ministry of Defense and Support of the Armed Forces 
of the Islamic Republic of Iran v Cubic Defense Systems Inc 
53 See C. Borris, R. Hennecke, Article V (1) (c), New York Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards Commentary, München, 
CH Beck, 2012, p. 321 ss.
54 The case Valenciana de Cementos v. Primary Coal (French Cour de Cassa-
tion, 22 October 1991), related to the ICC Award n. 5953/1989 of 1 September, is 
paradigmatic in this sense (see the analysis by Y. Derains, in Journ. dr. int., 1990, p. 
1061 ss.; B. Goldman, in Journ. dr. int., 1990, p. 433 ss.; P. Lagarde, in Revue de 
l’arbitrage, 1990, p. 666 ss.; and B. Oppetit, in Rev. crit. dr. int. pr., 1990, p. 307 ss.
55 See A. Giardina, La lex mercatoria e la certezza del diritto nei commerci e 
negli investimenti internazionali, in Riv. dir. int. priv. proc., 1992, p. 467 ss.
56 That is why under some opinions in the absence of choice the determination 
of the applicable law by arbitrators is completely free, as it is not subject to the 
control of national courts, maybe apart from Art. 68 AA England (see J.F. Pou-
dret y S. Besson, op. cit. supra n. 3, pp. 623-624). The wording of Art. 39.2 CAA 
Lithuania is particularly interesting: «If the parties have failed to agree on the appli-
cable law, the arbitral tribunal shall apply the law, which in the justified opinion of 
the arbitral tribunal, is applicable in resolving a particular dispute, including trade 
customs (lex mercatoria)». Finally, the arbitrator’s powers in this regard are wide, 
but their selection must be to some extent «justified».
57 See D. Moura Vicente, La aplicación del principio iura novit curia en el 
arbitraje internacional, in Anuario IHLADI, vol. 23, 2017-2018, pp. 71-72.
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(1998)58 empowers arbitrators to base their decisions on legal 
theories and rules different from those invoked by the parties, 
as far as it does not violate the limit of the arbitral submission. 
In French Law, arbitrators must not give reasons for legal argu-
ments implied in the debate, as far as they are consistent with 
the applicable law, but many doubts arise about the effects of 
unexpected omissions of the applicable law or the attribution to 
the applicable law of a content or sense completely unexpected 
during the arbitral procedure59.
Therefore, if parties have chosen the applicable law, they have 
to present their arguments and interpretations providing evidence 
of its content during the procedure, but not extemporarily (e.g. in 
final written conclusions). Arbitrators cannot accept such unex-
pected evidence on applicable law without giving the other party 
the chance to argue or contradict that evidence or argument60. 
Likewise, in the absence of choice, arbitrators are not obliged 
to reveal their legal reasons before the award, buy they cannot 
surprise the parties thereto by applying an unexpected law61. Af-
ter a comparative analysis of this question Poudret and Besson 
conclude that if arbitrators intend to apply a different law than 
that invoked by the parties, they must reveal it in good time. 
They are free to choose any of the applicable law invoked by the 
parties during the arbitral proceeding, and in any case they will 
58 Yearbook of Commercial Arbitration, vol. XXIV, 1999, p. 875.
59 See M. Scherer, Article V (1) (b), New York Convention on the Recognition 
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards Commentary, Munich, CH Beck, 
2012, pp. 307-308.
60 Cour d’Appel de Paris of 18 April 1991 (Supermarket Systems). French case-
law is very clear in considering questions referred to foreign applicable law as a 
fact, so that if a party present a proof or evidence supporting its interpretation on 
the applicable law it must be in a procedural time permitting the other party to 
argue against it (e.g. Cour d’Appel de Paris, 6 April 1995: Thyssen Stahlunion; Cour 
d’appel de Paris, 25 November 1997: VRV SpA; Cour de Cassation, 16 March 1999: 
affaire Etat du Qatar v Creighton).
61 That is the rule in German or Swiss Law [e.g. Swiss Federal Court, 30 Sep-
tember 2003, ASA Bull., 2004, p. 544; and 9 February 2009 (José Urquijo Goitia v 
Liedson da Silva Muñiz) 4A_4000/2008, ASA Bull., 2009, p. 495 ss.]. English Law 
is even more demanding in this sense. In Finland, the Supreme Court judgment of 
2 July 2008 (Werfen Austria GmbH v Polar Electro Europeo BV) show the same 
rigor, as well as the Court of Appeal of Svea (Sweden) of 1 December 2009 (Sys-
tembolagest v V&S Spirit). See. C.P. Alberti, op. cit. in n. 35, p. 20 s.
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apply the law applicable to the merits ex officio and they are not 
determined by the interpretation argued by the parties, but they 
must guarantee the parties an adequate debate thereon62.
5. Reasoning and overriding mandatory rules. – A difficult (a 
final) question deals with overriding mandatory rules. We have 
pointed out that the need for arbitrators to consider in any case 
some public policy rules avoids a pure non-legal consideration 
of arbitration in equity. But the most frequent problem arises in 
arbitration in law, relating to the obligation of the arbitrator to 
apply overriding mandatory rules, even if those rules are not part 
of the applicable law chosen by the parties63. 
Rules on competition, environmental and health protection, 
free trade, human rights, and so on are considered as overriding 
mandatory rules, whose application must be expected and fore-
seen by the parties. First of all, overriding mandatory rules of 
the applicable law must be considered. To avoid the possibilities 
of annulment or non recognition of arbitral awards, arbitrator 
must also take into account overriding mandatory rules and pub-
lic policy principles from the law of the arbitral seat and also of 
the most probable place of recognition or enforcement. German 
authors speak in this sense about the capability of arbitral awards 
to be exported (Exportfähigkeit).
But particularly in the field of international contracts, overrid-
ing mandatory rules of third States closely connected, especially 
those of the law of contract’s performance, must be taken into 
account. This possibility has been expressly stated by the ECJ 
in the “ECO Swiss” case in 1999 in relation with anti-trust Eu-
ropean rules64. However, the most liberal legal systems, such as 
the French, are reluctant to allow this application, insofar as it 
62 Op. cit. supra n. 3, p. 785.
63 See L.G. Radicati di Brozolo, Arbitrage commercial international et lois 
de police (considérations sur les conflits de juridictions dans le commerce interna-
tional), in R. des C., vol. 315 2005, p. 53 ss.; C. Seraglini, Lois de police et justice 
arbitrale internationale, Paris, Dalloz, 2001.
64 ECJ C-129/9, 1 June 1999, Eco Swiss; ECJ C-102/81, 23 March 1982, Nordsee. 
See C. Liebscher, European Public Policy, in Journ. Int’l. Arb., 2000, p. 73 ss.; 
D. Hochstrasser, Choice of Law and Foreign Mandatory Rules in International 
Arbitration, in Journ. Int’l. Arb., 1994, p. 85; H. Verbist, The Application of Eu-
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implies straying away from the mission entrusted by the parties. 
International arbitral practice, however, demonstrates that appli-
cation of overriding mandatory rules of third States constitutes 
a general principle of comparative private international law. At 
least, this is the opinion of the International Chamber of Com-
merce, acting as amicus curiae before the USA Supreme Court in 
the case Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler – Plymouth: 
«there is a growing tendency of international arbitrators to take 
into account the antitrust laws and other mandatory legal rules 
expressing public policy enacted by a State that has a significant 
relationship to the facts of the case, even though that State’s law 
does not govern the contract by virtue of the parties’ choice or 
applicable conflicts rules»65.
Recently, this principle has been recognised for the first time 
in an arbitral regulation. Article 30, paragraph 4, of the Draft 
Rules of Arbitration and Conciliation of the Organization for the 
Harmonization of Business Law in the Caribbean states: «The 
arbitral tribunal may take into account the peremptory rules of 
a State which is closely related to the contract out of which the 
dispute arises, where the parties have to perform their obligations 
in the said State, and provided that the content of such rules is in 
accordance with generally-acknowledged public interests».
To some extent, the tendency to increase consideration of 
overriding mandatory rules in international commercial arbitra-
tion is a logical counterweight to another increasing tendency, 
consisting in the extension of arbitrability. In most legal systems 
arbitrability was limited to subjects characterized by a wide party 
autonomy. However, it is more and more usual to extend the va-
lidity of arbitral agreements referred to matters usually linked to 
public interests, such as company law, antitrust law, bankruptcy 
or industrial property. The possibility to submit subjects highly 
connected with public interests to arbitration requires arbitrators 
to be willing to apply overriding mandatory rules and public 
policy principles from the supranational, international and na-
tional legal systems involved.
ropean Community Law in ICC Arbitration, Bull. CIA/CCI (Special Suplement: 
International Commercial Arbitration in Europe), 1994, p. 33 ss.
65 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler – Plymouth, 473 US 614.
ISBN 978-88-495-4199-1  © Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane
162 Sixto A. Sánchez Lorenzo
However, the behaviour of arbitrators in this regard is far for 
being uncontroversial. If arbitrators opt for applying overriding 
mandatory rules ex officii, although these are not invoked by 
the parties, the door is open to a claim for the award to be set 
aside as an ultra petita award. Besides this, such rules must be 
incorporated in the arbitration procedure in a moment permit-
ting an adequate debate between the parties thereon. Finally, if 
the parties have expressly excluded the application of overriding 
mandatory rules of a determined legal system, which arbitrators 
are inclined to apply in a peremptory way, the only chance for 
arbitrators could be the renunciation due to illegality of the arbi-
tral agreement. Most audacious authors support the possibility of 
stating an effective, executive award founded on such overriding 
mandatory rules, facing the possibility of an annulment remedy 
on the ground of exceeded submission66. 
In short, there is no pure arbitration without law. Arbitration 
in law chosen by the parties, arbitration in non-national law cho-
sen by arbitrators, and even arbitration in equity require all a fine 
consideration of different overriding mandatory rules. 
It is said that the value of an arbitration procedure depends 
on the value of arbitrators. So, the key for the success on any 
arbitration procedure is a good selection of arbitrators who must 
be specialized not mainly in arbitration law, but rather in the 
specific subject the arbitration deals with. That is why experts in 
comparative private law, such as the members of the REDPREA 
network, are welcome in the new age of arbitration.
66 See L.G. Radicati di Brozolo, op. cit. in n. 62, pp. 476-481.
